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Author: Alexander Pruss
Added by: carlosdam01
Added Date: 2021-08-05
Language: eng
Subjects: Philosophy
Collections: folkscanomy philosophy, folkscanomy, additional collections
Pages Count: 600
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Description
Contents
Introduction
XIII
1
Section 1
Generic definitions and basic modal realism
1
Section 2
Metaphysical versus logical possibility?
6
Section 3
S5
13
Section 4
Kight views of possibility
17
4.1
Parmenides, Leslie, and Reschcr
17
4.2
Leucippus, Democritus, Meinong, Lewis,
and Aristotle
23
4.3
The linguistic view
27
4.4
A Platonic primitive modality view
28
4.5
Aristotle again and branching
30
4.6
Leibniz
31
4.7
Modal irrealism
32
4.8
Conventionalism
34
Applications and pseudo-applications
39
Section 1
Modality
39
1.1
Box and diamond
39
1.2
The global nature of modal claims
40
1.3
Supervenience
40
1.4
Transworld comparison
41
Section 2
Counterfactuals and causality
42
2.1
Lewis’s account of counterfactuals and
counterexamples
42
2.2
A fix and the coat thief problem
45
2.3
Causation and the order of time
47
2.3.1
The basic argument
47
2.3.2
Taking the direction of time as primitive
49
X Contents
2.3.3 Deriving the direction of time from increase
of entropy 49
2.3.4 The openness or unreality of the future 51
Section 3 Propositions 52
3.1 Unstructured propositions 52
3.2 Structured propositions 54
Section 4 Properties 60
Section 5 Overall assessment 61
Part III The Lewisian ontology of extreme modal realism 63
Section 1 The Lewisian account of possible worlds 63
Section 2 Identity vs. counterpart theory 66
2.1 Arguments for counterpart theory 66
2.2 Arguments for identity theory 69
2.2.1 General arguments 69
2.2.2 Attributions of ability 70
2.3 Conclusions about identity and counterpart
versions of basic EMR 75
Section 3 Indiscernible worlds? 75
Section 4 Lewis’s arguments for his ontology 81
Section 5 Objections to Lewis’s indexical account of
actuality 82
5.1 Common sense 82
5.2 Is “the actual world” indexical? 84
5.3 Substitution 86
Section 6 The possibility of spatio-temporally
unrelated co-actual entities 88
Section 7 Cardinality and the “set” of all possible
worlds 91
7.1 Introduction 91
7.2 There is no set of all possible worlds 92
7.3 Lewis’s proviso 95
7.4 What should Lewis do about the
cardinality problem? 96
Section 8 Ethical issues 97
8.1 The ethical objection 97
8.2 The indexicality of morality 98
8.3 Ethical problems for counterpartist EMR 100
8.3.1 A transworld counterfactual 100
8.3.2 The first case: saving a life 101
Contents xi
8.3.3
The second case: self-torture
105
8.3.4
Forking
106
8.3.5
The need for some consequentialistic
considerations in ethics
107
Section 9
Induction and actuality
110
9.1
Introduction
110
9.2
Neutral ground
112
9.3
The Humean argument and a reply Lewis
cannot give
114
9.4
Conclusions and a formalization
117
Section 10
The epistemological objection
119
Section 11
Explaining the actual in terms of the
necessary
122
Section 12
A final assessment of EMR
123
Platonic ersatz ontologies
125
Section 1
The general strategy
125
1.1
A cheap ersatzism
127
Section 2
Linguistic approaches
130
2.1
The basic idea
130
2.2
Objection from alien properties
132
2.3
Primitive modality
134
2.4
The arbitrariness objection
135
2.5
Mathematical constructions
136
2.6
Combinatorialism and Armstrong
137
2.7
Fictionalist approaches
139
2.7.1
Strong fictionalism
139
2.7.2
Timid factionalism
141
2.7.3
Sider’s pluriverse
147
Section 3
Platonism
155
3.1
Platonic approaches to modality
155
3.2
What are propositions?
155
3.3
Objections to Platonic Ersatzism
158
3.3.1
The set-theoretic objection
158
3.3.2
Alien properties
159
3.3.3
I low do propositions represent?
159
3.3.4
The unmet extended Parmenidean
challenge
162
3.3.5
Actuality and possibility
165
3.3.6
Powers
171
XII Contents
3.4 Avoiding grounding? 172
Section 4 Conclusions 176
Part V Sketches towards a Spinozistic-Tractarian account of
modality 179
Section 1 Asserting, naming, and infallibility 179
Section 2 Spinoza 181
Section 3 A radical theory of modality 188
Section 4 Costs 192
Section 5 The Less Radical Theory 202
Part VI Aristotelian-Leibnizian ontology 205
Section 1 Leibniz’s approach 205
1.1 Leibniz’s argument for the existence of
God and the explanation of the nature of abstracta 205
1.2 How propositions and possible worlds
represent 208
1.3 The Parmenidean challenge revisited and an assessment of the Leibnizian
approach 210
Section 2 Aristotelian possibility and causality 211
2.1 Proximate matter, proximate cause, and
Parmenides 211
2.2 The basic Aristotelian view 213
2.3 Global possibilities: a difficulty 216
2.4 A direct argument for a necessary being 217
2.5 S5, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and
the cosmological argument 218
2.6 The Aristotelian-Leibnizian view 221
2.7 Branching and other modalities 223
2.8 Indeterminism 223
Section 3 Combining with the Spinozistic-Tractarian
view 224
Section 4 Ordinary alethic modal talk 226
Section 5 The Principle of Sufficient Reason 228
5.1 From the PSR to the Aristotelian view of
modality 228
5.2 The van Inwagen objection 230
Section 6 Ontology and implications 235
6.1 Natures and other necessitators 235
6.2 Dispositions 239
6.3 Shoemaker’s powers 241
6.4 Explanation 243
6.5 Reduction 244
6.6 Some assembly required? 248
6.7 How we know what is possible 251
6.8 The structure of the space of possibilities 252
Section 7 The main challenges to Lewisian and
Platonic ontologies can be resolved 254
7.1 Primitive modality 254
7.2 Transworld identity 255
7.2.1 Identity option 1 : haecceities 255
7.2.2 Identity option 2: the identity of indiscernibles and a causal-historical
account of identity 256
7.2.3 Identity option 3: divine ideas as differing
between worlds 260
7.2.4 Conclusions about identity 262
7.3 Attributions of ability 262
7.4 No set of all possible worlds 263
7.5 The ethical objection 263
7.6 Inductive reasoning 264
7.7 Explaining with necessity 265
Section 8 Objections to the Aristotelian-Leibnizian
view 265
8.1 Primitive causal modality 265
8.2 Evil and the apparent compatibility of all
things 266
8.3 Is God omnipotent if logical possibility is
defined in terms of his power? 267
8.4 The wrong way around? 269
8.5 Necessary being 270
8.6 Obscurity 273
8.7 Creaturely free will 274
8.8 Divine simplicity 274
8.9 Incompatible powers 276
Contents xiii
X I V Contents
Parr VII Final conclusions
Section 1
Cost-benefit arguments for the
Aristotelian-Leibnizian ontology of
possible worlds
1.1
Modality
1.2
Explanation of what propositions are
1.3
Not a completely new ontology
1.4
Connection with theistic arguments for the
existence of Cod
Secrion 2
Choosing between accounts of possibility
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