PART I

A Theory of Good as Fulfilment

1  The Basic Theory: Appetites and Fulfilment

1.1  Actuality and potentiality

1.2  Appetite as potentiality: the tendencies of

things

1.3  Seven objections to goodness as fulfilment

1.4  Fulfilment as non-arbitrariness: the principle

of finality

2  Developing the Scholastic Conception of

Goodness

2.1  Goodness as neither essentially moral nor

essentially organic

2.2  The attributive/predicative debate 2.3  Final and contributory goodness

2.4  Goodness ‘in a way’

3  A Case for Inorganic Goodness

3.1  Instantiation and approximation

3.2  Continuation in existence as a tendency

3.3  The objection from radioactivity

3.4  False analogies: inertia and conservation

3.5  Is existence itself good?

4  The Good in the Living

4.1  From inorganic to organic goodness

4.2  The good in the vegetative appetites

4.3  The good in the sensitive appetites

4.4  Sexual cannibalism and related objections

4.5  The good in the rational appetite

PART II

A Theory of Evil as Privation

5  In Defence of the Privation Theory

5.1  Privation and need

5.2  Privation and evil

5.3  Some painful objections

5.4  Objections from morality: malice and punishment

6  Evil and Truthmaking

6.1  Truthmaker theory and negative truths

6.2  Absences

6.3  The totality theory

6.4  The exclusion theory

6.5  Truthmakers for privative truths

7  Evil as Cause and Effect

7.1  The fundamental problem

7.2  Absence causation

7.3  Privative causal truths

7.4  Armstrong's analysis: the contrast

8  The Reality of Evil

8.1  Non-negotiable truths about evil

8.2  Why it matters that evil is conceptual being

8.3  The reality of evil in the good

8.4  The mystery of evil